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In 1988, Petitioner

pleaded guilty to second degree murder in New York County and

received a sentence of 15 years to life in prison. Currently, Petitioner is incarcerated at the
Otisville Correctional Facility, in Orange County. On May 3, 2005, Respondent denied
Petitioner's second parole application at the Woodbourne Correctional Facility, in Sullivan

County, holding:
Parole is again denied due to the seriousness of your crime.
.

.

a

This is your only conviction. You have had satisfactory
institutional adjustment. The material submitted to the Board
enumerates your many institutional accomplishments and support
in the community. However, to hold otherwise would deprecate
the seriousness of your crime . . . .
On September 2 1, 2005, Petitioner filed an administrative appeal challenging Respondent's

decision. Respondent denied Petitioner's appeal at its principal office, in Albany County.

On April 24, 2006, Petitioner filed this Article 78 proceeding in New York County,
challenging the May 3, 2005 decision of the Respondent, New York County Division of Parole,
which denied Petitioner's application for parole. Petitioner argues, in essence, that the Board's
1

“exclusive reliance on the severity of the offense to deny parole not only contravenes the
discretionary scheme mandated by statute, but also effectively constitutes an unauthorized
resentencing ofthe defendant.” Wallman v. Travis,18 A.D.3d 304, 307, 794 N.Y.S.2d 381, 386
(lstDept. 2005). Moreover, it is “the duty of the Board to give fair consideration to each of the
applicable statutory factors as to every person who comes before it, and where the record
convincingly demonstrates that the Board [failed] to consider the proper standards, the courts
must intervene.’’ Graziano v. Pataki, No. 06 Civ. 0480(CLB) (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006)(avail at

2006 WL 2023082, at *9). Here, the Board allegedly paid lip service to the statutory factors, and
although “all of the factors favoring parole, other than the crime itself, had been met,” it
summarily denied him “parole based on its finding that, because the crime was heinous, parole
‘would deprecate the seriousness of [petitioner’s] criminal acts and undermine respect for law.”’

Phillips v. Dennison, Index No. 103509/06, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Oct. 12, 2006) (avail at
N.Y.L.J. 10/12/06, p. 23, col. 1).

Petitioner suggests that the decision “was a foregone

conclusion” and that any reviewing court must annul the determination, notwithstanding that
court’s belief as to whether petitioner has served a sufficient sentence for the underlying crime.

See King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 431-32, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245, 250-51

(1“ Dept. 1993), aff’d, 83 N.Y.2d 788,610 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1994).
Respondent has not responded to these compelling arguments yet. Instead, pursuant to

CPLR

5 5 5 10 and 5 11, Respondent served Petitioner with a written demand to change venue to

either Albany or Sullivan County. Respondent now cross-moves to change venue to one of these
counties. Petitioner has opposed Respondent’s demand, stating that New York County, where
1

the underlying crime took place, is an appropriate venue. In addition, petitioner contends that

2

respondent is forum shopping and courts should not allow this conduct. For the reasons below,
the Court grants Respondent’s cross-motion.
CPLR 5 506 (b) provides that:
A proceeding against a body or officer shall be commenced in any county within
the judicial district where the respondent made the determination complained of
or refused to perform the duty specifically enjoined upon him by law, or where
the proceedings were brought or taken in the course of which the matter sought to
be restrained originated, or where the material events otherwise took place, or
where the principal office of the respondent is located.
It is undisputed that, under this statute, Albany and Sullivan Counties are proper bases for venue.
According to the first provision of CPLR

5 506 (b), venue is proper in Sullivan County, because

it is where the Respondent made the parole determination complained of. Under the second
provision, venue is proper in Albany County, because it is where Petitioner’s administrative
appeal was taken. Under the fourth provision, venue is also proper in Albany County, because it
is where the Respondent’s principal office is located.

The parties dispute whether venue is also proper in New York County, where Petitioner
has commenced this proceeding. Petitioner argues that venue is proper in New York County
because his underlying crime, trial, and sentencing are “material events’) that “otherwise took
place’’ there. Petitioner also argues that principles of statutory construction and interpretation
require denial of Respondent’s cross-motion.
Petitioner argues that if a parole determination refers to the serious of a crime, venue is
proper in the county where the crime occurred. See Key v. New York State Division of Parole,
10 Misc.3d 1072, 814 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2006) (avail at 2006 WL 121938).

Contrary to this argument, CPLR

5

506 (b) does not permit venue in the counties of the

underlying crime, conviction, or sentencing for challenges to parole determinations. Instead,
3

venue must be placed in the judicial district where the challenged determination took place or the
district where respondent’s principal ofice is located. Howard v. New York State Board of

Parole, 5 A.D.3d 271, 773 N.Y.S.2d 300 (lSt Dept. 2004).

“[Allthough convictions and

sentences are always material to parole determinations they are not events that have taken place
in connection with ‘the determination complained of.”’ Wallace v. New York State Board of

Parole, Index No. 400241/06, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 18, 2006)(avail at.5/17/2006 N.Y.L.J.

22, (col. 1)). Otherwise, prisoners who had committed other crimes would obtain “a wide choice
of venue options simply because their [prior] convictions were material factors” in the parole
board’s determination. Id.
Petitioner’s second argument is that principles of statutory construction and interpretation
require dismissal of Respondent’s cross-motion. According to Petitioner, to interpret the CPLR

5

506 (b) provision “where the material events otherwise took place” as meaning where the

denial of parole took place creates redundancy with the provision “where respondent made the
determination complained of.” (Pet. Mem. at 4). Petitioner is correct that statutory provisions
must not be construed so that that they are superfluous. See Statutes

6

144. However, the

provision is not redundant; instead, it applies, in circumstances in which the underlying
determination itself is called into play. E.g., Browne v. New York State Board of Parole, 10

N.Y.2d 116, 122, 218 N.Y.S.2d 33, 36 (1961)(where Parole Board may have miscalculated term
of prison sentences, the sentences in which prison terms were computed were “so closely

interwoven” with determination as to be material). Here, on the other hand, Petitioner currently
challenges Respondent’s parole determination, which does not involve the counties in which his
crime, conviction, or sentencing occurred,

4

The Court finds that Howard v. New York State Board of Parole, 5 A.D.3d 271, 773
N.Y.S.2d 300 (18tDept. 2004) is dispositive here. In Howard, the petitioner argued that his New
York County crime, trial, and sentencing were so closely interwoven with the parole
determination that they constituted “material events” that “otherwise took place.” See Wallace v.

New York State Board of Parole, Index No. 400241/06, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 18, 2006)
(avail at 5/17/2006 N.Y:L.J. p. 22, col. 1) (quoting Pet.’s Brief to First Dept. in Howard). The
First Department held that the respondent had waived its venue challenge and decided the issue

on this basis. However, it also rejected the petitioner’s argument in dicta when it stated that
“venue in a case such as this should have been placed in the judicial district where the
determination complained of took place or where respondent’s principal office is located.” Id. at
272, 773 N.Y.S.2d at 300. Several subsequent cases in this County have followed this precedent.

See, e.g., W e b v. DenyIisSorz, Index No. 108904/05 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County January 19, 2006);
Wallace v. New York State Board of Parole, Index No. 400241/06, (Sup, Ct. N.Y. County May
18,2006) (avail at 5/17/2006 N.Y.L.J. p. 22, col. 1); Gonzalez v. Dennixon, Index No. 402346/05
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County October 31,2005 ).

The Court notes that other well reasoned cases in this County have determined that
Howard is not binding on the issue of venue. See, e.g., Crimmins v. Dennison, 12 Misc. 3d 726,
815 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2006); Schwartz v. Dennison, Index No. 115789/2005
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 8, 2006)(avail at 5/8/2006 N.Y.L.J. 19, (col. 1)). However, this

Court is persuaded by the thorough discussion and comprehensive analysis conducted by the
court in Wallace v. New York State Board ofParole, Index No. 400241/06, (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County May 18, 2006)(avail at 5/17/2006 N.Y.L.J. p. 22, col. 1). While a prisoner’s underlying
crime, conviction, and sentencing are factors that parole determinations reference, they are not
5

“material events” that “otherwise took place.” Id. This Court refers the parties to Wallace for
its analysis of this issue.
For the reasons stated above, venue is proper in either Sullivan County, where the
determination complained of took place, or Albany County, where Respondent’s principal office

is located. Neither party has expressed a preference between these locations; and, in fact,
respondent asks for either option in the alternative. The court notes, however, that many courts
have accepted the argument Petitioner currently propounds: that Respondent is forum shopping
by attempting to transfer venue in all Article 78 parole denial cases to Albany County, where it
has received overwhelmingly favorable decisions. See Crimmins v. Dennixon, 12 Misc. 3d 726,
815 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2006); see also Caher, John, “Decisions Split on Right

Venue for Parole Cases,” 5/15/2006 N.Y.L.J. p. 1, col. 3 (noting that “at a recent hearing (Matter
of William R. Phillips, 103509/06,) Justice Marcy S. Friedman referred to the ‘recent spate of
decisions to transfer Article 78 proceedings challenging parole board determinations to Albany’
and said that to the extent that they ’reflect an attempt to judge shop, that attempt should not be
condoned by the Court.”’). Respondent denies that it is or has been forum shopping; and, here it

seeks transfer to either Albany or Sullivan County, without expressing a preference for either
venue. As noted above, either county is appropriate under CPLR

6 506

(b). Therefore, this

Court exercises its discretion and transfers this matter to Sullivan County, one of the two options
proffered without preference by Respondent.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the cross-motion to change venue is granted, and it is further
O R D E E D that the venue of this action is changed from this Court to the Supreme
Court, Sullivan County, and the Clerk of this Court is directed to transfer the papers on file in

6

this proceeding, Index Number 40222Y2006, to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Sullivan
County, upon service of a copy of this order with notice of entry and the payment of appropriate
fees, if any, and it is fiuther
ORDERED that Respondent shall have thirty (30) days from the transfer of this
proceeding to serve and file an answer.

ORDERED:

Dated: October”242006

LouisB. York, J.S.C.

LOUIS B. YORK
.>., ,
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